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COURTS - CONTEIPT - PROHIBITION OF PHOTOGRAPHS AT AR-
RAIGNIVIENT.-State v. Clifford, .... Ohio App.. ... 118 N.E.2d 853
(1954). One Giaimo, a co-worker of the defendant newspaper
reporter, was warned by the court that no photographs could
be taken in the courtroom or chambers at the arraignment of a
former judge, to take place the following day. In defiance of
this order, Giaimo, assisted by the defendant Thomas and di-
rected by the defendant Clifford, took a picture at the arraign-
ment proceedings. As a result of this action, the defendants were
cited for contempt of court and found guilty.
Whether or not the prohibition of photographs at an arraign-
ment is an abuse of the judge's discretion in regulating courtroom
procedure and decorum was the question presented to the court
of appeals. The court decided that it was not.
In general, contempt is a disregard of, disobedience to, or dis-
orderly or insolent interruption of, the proceedings of a legisla-
tive or judicial body, In re MacKnight, 11 Mont. 126, 27 Pac.
336 (1891), and was an offense at common law. It was con-
sidered an offense against the court as an organ of public justice
and, as such, was punishable by the court. Meyers v. United
States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1923). Since a court has an inherent
right to conduct its work and sessions without disturbance, one
who does disturb that peace and good order is guilty of contempt.
In re Seed, 140 Misc. 681, 251 N.Y. Supp. 615 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
Though this power to punish for contempt has been used
sparingly in the past, it has been generally held that it is com-
pletely within the discretion of the injured court in determining
and dealing with contempt. Thompson v. Thompson, 197 App.
Div. 228, 188 N.Y.Supp. 785 (2d Dep't 1921). A wilful failure
to comply with a court order is such an interference with the
administration of justice as to constitute a contempt. In re
Sylvester, 41 F.2d 231 (S.D. N.Y. 1930).
For quite a long period of time the test of contempt was
whether or not the contemptuous act was done within the physi-
cal confines of the courtroom. Batchelder v. Moore, 42 Cal. 412
(1871). An action committed outside the building which housed
the court could not be punished by the abused court even though
the work of the court may have been seriously hampered. In re
Oldham, 89 N.C. 23 (1883).
Although the Supreme Court expressly overruled Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918) in Nye v.
United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941), the words used seem to vindi-
cate the instant decision, 313 U.S. at 52, "It was not misbehavior
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in the vicinity of the court disrupting to quiet and order or
actually interrupting the court in the conduct of its business." In
the Toledo case, supra, a newspaper publisher had criticized the
action of a federal court in a pending case. The instant case in-
volved a physical action within the confines of the courtroom
in defiance of the express warnings of the judge.
The authority to act summarily against publishers and their
associates has generally been upheld in the United States.
Respublica v. Oswald, I Dall. 319 (U.S. 1788). When a publica-
tion will tend to obstruct justice is a question of degree which
a trial court intimately conversant with the particular situation,
must pass upon. Freedom of the press, though guaranteed by
the Constitution, cannot be exploited in a manner which destroys
the equal and correlative right of an accused to a fair and im-
partial trial. U.S. CONST. AimEND. I; Pennekamp v. State, 328
U.S. 331 (1946).
In regard to specific instances of the taking and publication
of photographs of courtroom proceedings, it has been held that
pictures of a prisoner on the way to the courtroom may be
prohibited and any photographs taken in defiance of such a
court order may be confiscated. Ex Parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136
Atl. 312 (1927). In another case strikingly similar to the instant
case, a newspaper photographer who merely took pictures of
the corridors of the courthouse was found guilty of contempt.
In re Seed, supra. The court there held that the snapping of
photographs, even those taken outside the immediate area of
the courtroom, may be done in such a manner as to disturb the
decorum of the court and it was properly within the discretion
of the trial judge to ban such an action.
While the freedom conferred upon the press has been given
a broad construction by the courts, it has never been interpreted
as an absolute license to publish anything, free from all civil
or criminal liability. Shaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466
(1919); Layne v. Tribune Co., 129 Ala. 349, 146 So. 234 (1933). It
is apparent then that this right does not deprive the state of its
sovereign duty to exercise police power in preserving law and
order. Barton v. City of Bessemer, 234 Ala. 20, 173 So. 626 (1936).
Yet this "due administration of justice" has received a much
more qualified definition in recent years and the privileges
granted to the nation's press have increased. See Bridges v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941).
In the instant case, the misbehavior was direct, in the presence
of the court, and in violation of an express command; contempt
both at common law and under the state statute. OHIO REV. CODE
§ 2101.23 (1953). It is submitted that the court, having authority
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to regulate the character of proceedings within its own bar,
properly exercised its discretion in ordering that no pictures be
taken.
Searching beneath the surface of the facts of the case, it
becomes apparent that the sole purpose of the court was not
merely to maintain order within its domain but it also sought
to protect the defendant from unwarranted and damaging pub-
licity. The result is that the court has intervened to protect the
defendant from prejudicial publicity and to insure a fair trial.
The aspect of the instant case which distinguishes it from the
vast majority of contempt proceedings against the press is the
fact that the court was punishing the defendant not for the
publication of the photograph, but for the momentary disturbance
caused in the courtroom by the flash of the camera bulbs. The net
effect is the same- the complete prohibition of courtroom
photographs.
An excellent presentation of the difficulties encountered by
the courts in reconciling the right of the press to bring pictures
of current news value to the public and the duty of the court
to maintain at all times a proper decorum in the courtroom is
contained in United States v. Suliens, 36 F.25 230, 238 (S.D.
Miss. 1929):
The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though
separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be
violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights
and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Con-
stitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative and
the latter its jurisdiction .... This court must be permitted to proceed
with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from
outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This
right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last
resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act
to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.
The court in the instant case not only followed accepted judicial
precedent, but has also relied upon approved ethical standards
for the legal profession. See CA&ows oF JUDICIAL ETmcs OF THE
A M CAN BAR AssocIATiON, CANOx No. 35 (1947). The court
did not seek to ban the press entirely; it sought only to prevent
disturbances which would have or might have presented the
arraignment proceedings in a "circus" light. The major signifi-
cance of the instant case was not the extension of judicial dis-
cretionary powers but the vigorous enforcement of a sometimes
neglected, though long-standing, judicial duty to maintain a de-




DEEDS-LEGAL DELIVERY-EFFECTIVENESS OF UNRECORDED MU-
TUAL DEEDS TO REALTY BETWEEN HUSBAND AND Wn -Kniebbe
v. Wade, 161 Ohio St. 294, 118 N.E.2d 833 (1954). The plaintiff,
daughter of the decedent and stepdaughter of the defendant,
brings this action to determine her rights in certain realty in
which the decedent owned an undivided one half interest. After
obtaining a divorce from the plaintiff's mother, the decedent
married the defendant and thereafter acquired four parcels of
real estate which he and his wife owned as tenants in common.
They then executed and exchanged mutual deeds to each other
for their undivided one half interests. This interchange of deeds
was accomplished in the office of a notary public who acknowl-
edged both transactions. The unrecorded deeds were taken to
their home by the wife and placed in a box readily accessible to
both. Upon her husband's death, the defendant recorded the
four deeds from the decedent to her. The daughter, upon learn-
ing of her father's death, brought an action for declaratory judge-
ment against her stepmother, the decedent's surviving widow,
for an order declaring her right, title and interest in the four
parcels of realty.
The court of common pleas, whose decision was subsequently
affirmed by the court of appeals, entered judgement for the de-
fendant declaring that the four deeds vested title in the wife. In
reversing these decisions, the Supreme Court of Ohio in essence
held that the deeds were testamentary in character and invalid
for lack of a legal delivery. The question to be resolved by the
court was whether or not there was a valid delivery and accept-
ance as a present, immediate, and unconditional conveyance of
title from one to the other.
It is a settled principle in the law of real property deeds that,
in order to constitute a valid conveyance, there must be both a
delivery by the grantor and an acceptance by the grantee. Dobbs
v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 65 Ga.App. 796, 16 S.E.2d 485
(1941); Tighe v. Davis, 283 Mich. 244, 278 N.W. 60, 62 (1938).
The delivery by the grantor must be accompanied by an inten-
tion to pass a present, immediate and unconditional title. Seibert
v. Seibert, 379 Ill. 470, 41 N.E.2d 544 (1942). The Supreme Court
of Georgia recently reaffirmed the principle that a primary req-
uisite for the validity of a conveyance is the necessity of delivery
after execution. Giuffrida v. Knight, 210 Ga. 128, 78 S.E.2d 29
(1953). These views were upheld in the instant case, with the
main issue centering upon what constitutes a valid delivery. In
Newton and Seeley v. Bealer, 41 Iowa 334 (1875), the plaintiffs,
heirs of the decedent, brought an action to set aside his deed on
the grounds that there was no valid delivery. The facts showed
that the decedent made a deed and left it with his papers; the
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defendent recorded the deed upon the latter's death. The court,
in holding for valid delivery, reiterated the principle that al-
though delivery is an essential element of a deed, this does not
mean the actual physical transfer of possession since it depends
largely on the surrounding circumstances coupled with the in-
tent of the grantor.
At common law, a deed was in its embryonic stage until de-
livery after which it came into its own existence as a separate
legal conveyance. In an historical analysis, the court in Willing-
ham v. Smith, 151 Ga. 102, 106 S.E. 117 (1921), stated 106 S.E. at
118:
In the early English cases the delivery of a deed of grant was re-
garded as in effect the symbolical transfer of the land itself, analogous
to livery of seisin. Hence a physical or manual delivery was deemed
essential. Contrary to the doctrine of the earlier cases, the modern
English view seems to be that delivery is largely a question of
intention.
As late as 1953, this case was cited and the import of the analysis
was explained and approved in Giuffrida v. Knight, supra. The
intent to part with control can be gathered from the surrounding
circumstances. Whether or not the grantor intended to reserve
the locus poenitentiae, is a true test of a valid conveyance re-
ceiving almost universal recognition. 7 THOMPsON, REAL
PROPERTY § 4113 (Perm. Ed. 1940). In the present decision, the
court adopted a very strict interpretation of delivery, seemingly
giving insufficient weight to the intention of the grantor.
Where a deed was placed in a trunk by the decedent and not
found until after his death, the court in Alford v. Henderson, 237
Ala. 27, 185 So. 368 (1938), held that a deed could not be de-
livered after the death of the grantor. The distinction determin-
ing validity of delivery was clearly stated, 185 So. at 369:
Although the actual custody of the instrument has not passed
from the hands of the grantor, any words or acts or both clearly
showing an intent that the deed be presently effective, become
the deed of the grantee, subject to his or her control, and is held by
the grantor or a third person as a mere agent or custodian of the
grantee, and evidence an effectual delivery. But where the grantor
reserves the locus poenitentiae, that is to say, not a mere custody,
but a right to withdraw from an incompleted transaction, reserves
control over the document in his own right, there is no delivery.
Following this principle, the possession of the deed or the prop-
erty by the grantor during his lifetime does not invalidate the
delivery. Delivery was affected and assent evidenced in Mc-
Devitt v. Morrow, 57 Ohio L.Abst. 281, 94 N.E.2d 2 (Ct. App.
1950), where the deed was placed in a safety deposit box and
carried under joint names. The intent, expressed or implied,
1954]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
together with a like acceptance were, once again, the controlling
factors. The presumption that the possession of a deed by the
grantee named therein evidences a valid delivery is supported
by a number of decisions. Cf. Rivera v. Ron, 51 Cal. App.2d 702,
125 P.2d 517 (1942); Lewis v. Tinsley, 66 S.D. 613, 287 N.W. 507
(1939).
The court in the instant case treats the deeds as not having
been delivered since the decedent had power and control over
them. The proposition that one who executes a deed and retains
possession of it until his death dies in full ownership of the
property has been judicially recognized. Alward v. Lobingier, 87
Kan. 106, 123 Pac. 867 (1912). But it is also true that it will not
be inoperative merely because the grantor retains possession
of the deed during his lifetime, if there is an intention of de-
livery evidenced by words or acts. Ferrell v. Stinson, 233 Iowa
1331, 11 N.W.2d 701 (1943). The controlling factor is the rec-
ognition of the intent of the parties. Huxley v. Liess, 226 Iowa
819, 285 N.W. 216 (1939); Mathewson v. Shields, 184 Wash. 260,
50 P.2d 898 (1935). This principle is stated clearly in 13 0. Jura.,
Deeds 876 § 63 (1st ed. 1930), where it is said that: "No particu-
lar form or ceremony is essential: delivery may now be made by
words and acts, or either, if accompanied with the intention that
they shall have that effect." (Emphasis added) The more rea-
sonable approach is that stated by the court in Newton and Seeley
v. Bealer, supra, at 339:
Where one who has the mental power to alter his intention, and the
physical power to destroy a deed in his possession, dies without doing
either, there is, it seems to us, but little reason for saying that his deed
shall be inoperative, simply because during life he might have done
that which he did not do. It is much more consonant with reason to
determine the effect of the deed by the intention existing up to the
time of death, than to refuse to give it that effect because the inten-
tion might have been changed.
Deeds conditioned on survivorship are testamentary in char-
acter and do not convey title since it is felt that they are an
attempt to avoid administration or the jurisdiction of a probate
court. In Landau v. Landau, 409 M. 556, 101 N.E.2d 103, 107
(1951), a deed was held to be testamentary in character where
the grantor conditioned them on his death. There was a retention
of either control or possession which negates a transfer of a
present interest. This should be done by a will,. as required by
law, and hence these deeds were invalid. The court, in the
present decision, states that the deeds were testamentary in
character because they were intended to be conditioned on sur-
vivorship. The purpose was to prevent interference from out-
siders. In Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, 7 N.D. 475, 75 N.W. 797
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(1898), a case cited as controlling by many courts, the purpose
for which the deeds were kept a secret was to prevent the wife
from acquiring interest. Here, the court recognized the deed,
presuming assent if it was beneficial to the grantee, and noted
the purpose to be, not the conditioning on death which would
have made it testamentary, but the protection of the conveyance.
There is a similarity of intent between this case and the present
case with the exception that in the case at bar, the intent was
not recognized as the controlling factor and the deeds were held
invalid. The delivery of a deed during a grantor's lifetime
changes its effect where its retention would have made it testa-
mentary in character. Nowakowski v. Sobeziak, 270 l. 622, 110
N.E. 809 (1915).
A case similar to the present factual situation in regard to the
issue of delivery, is In re Tummond's Estate, 158 Misc. 592, 287
N.Y.Supp. 386 (Surr. Ct. 1936). In this case, the husband and
wife executed mutual deeds conveying their home and property
to the other in the event of death. The husband placed the deeds
in the home safe to which the wife had access and could have
compelled delivery if she desired it. The deeds were not recorded
until after the husband's death, at which time, his deeds were
found but hers were not. The deed was held valid even though
there had been no delivery of possession since there were suffi-
cient facts or circumstances to show an intent on the part of the
grantor to convey. With these present, the actual possession of
the instrument itself is of secondary importance. The court re-
iterated the sound proposition that all cases seem to be governed
by the question of intent. Substantiating its decision, the court
cites Fisher v. Hall, 41 N.Y. 416 (1869), as the leading case de-
claring that there must be other facts or surrounding circum-
stances which evidence an intent to part with the title. Even
more explicitly, it cites Wallace v. Berdell, 97 N.Y. 13 (1884),
where the court quoted from 4 Kent's Com. 456, 97 N.Y. at
22-3:
If both parties be present, and the usual formalities of execution
take place, and the contract is to all appearances consummated with-
out any conditions or qualifications annexed, it is a complete and valid
deed, not withstanding it be left in the custody of the grantor.
These cases resound with the authoritative proposition that in-
tent is to govern-a clear and logical approach to the problem of
giving effect to a grantor's conveyances. The situation in In re
Tummond's Estate, supra, was similar to that in the instant case,
nevertheless, the decisions are contrary. The lower courts, in
holding the deeds valid, should have been affirmed in view of
past decisions in the majority of jurisdictions.
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The decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio was based on the
proposition that, since there was not delivery and acceptance
with a present, immediate and unconditional conveyance of title,
the deeds in question were testamentary in character and in-
operative to pass title. Although citing many cases to support
its contention that there was and could have been no delivery,
the court avoided the question of intention, which, according to
the majority of jurisdictions, is the controlling factor. Even
though some control had been retained by the grantor, neverthe-
less, it would appear that this should be considered in conjunc-
tion with the intent of the grantor and not to the exclusion of it.
In so emphasizing the control, it adopted a narrow and strict in-
terpretation of the facts. This would seem to be against the
trend in the courts today to give effect to the intention behind
an act. Whether or not the courts will further narrow their
approach, will only be determined as such cases are adjudicated
in the future.
Edmund L. White
INJUNCTION-UNFAIR COMPETITION-CONTRACT NOT TO COM-
PETE OR USE NAME.-Madison v. La Sene, .... Wash.2d...., 268
P.2d 1006 (1954). Plaintiff and vendor, Andrew La Sene, en-
tered into a contract for the sale of an upholstery business in-
cluding the leasing of the premises, the business's good will and
the use of the name, "La Sene's Custom Upholstery." The ven-
dor covenanted not to engage in competition for five years within
a radius -of five miles. When plaintiff terminated his month-to-
month lease on the premises, vendor, irate over the termination,
established his inexperienced son, Ray, who knew of the cove-
nant but was not a party thereto, in the upholstery business at the
old location and used the name "La Sene".
The plaintiff was granted an injunction in the lower court on
the basis of conspiracy, fraud and deceit. The defendants, father
and son, were both ordered to obey, strictly, the terms of the
original covenant; that is, they were enjoined from carrying on
an upholstery business within a five mile radius under the name
"La Sene" for five years. The son appealed on the groiinds that
he was not a party to the original restrictive covenant.
The issue on appeal went to the question of whether the son,
Ray La Sene, could be enjoined from carrying on an upholstery
business within a five mile radius under the La Sene name.
The supreme court affirmed the injunction's prohibition of the
use of the name, basing its decision on a theory of conspiracy to
engage in unfair competition. The latter part of the injunction,
restraining appellant personally, was modified permitting him,
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under another name but not in conjunction with his father, to
enter the upholstery business.
Good will, included in the sale of a going business, has often
been the subject of litigation. The crux of the court's duty lies
in determining what preventive steps it should take to protect
the purchaser's property right in good will from any unfair com-
petition by the vendor.
The granting of good will does not, of course, require a
covenant by the vendor not to compete. Warp v. Warp, 307 IMI.
App. 205, 30 N.E.2d 148 (1940); Ranft v. Reimers, 200 IMI. App.
386, 65 N.E. 720 (1902); Mouton v. Herbert, 199 So. 172 (La.
1940). But because the vendor has not convenanted to refrain
from competing, does not mean he is free to resort to means
of competition which would jeopardize the good will which he
has sold. The rule recognized in the above three cases was stated
as follows in Warp v. Warp, supra, 30 N.E.2d at 148:
The rule is that the vendor of a business, or interest therein, includ-
ing the good will, may re-enter a rival or competing business in an
adjacent locality and publish, advertise for and solicit customers, if
there was no covenant... not to re-enter a like business.
Direct solicitation of old customers is a limitation on this rule
however. In Ranft v. Reimers, supra, the court said, 65 N.E. at
722:
We do not think that the defendant ought to be allowed, after selling
and warranting a good will to the complainants, to purposely en-
deavor to prevent their receiving the benefit of it [good will], or to
attempt to disturb them in its enjoyment.
In that case, the court enjoined the defendant from soliciting
old customers .directly, and also from using the former telephone
number of the business which she had sold.
In the situation where the vendor agrees not to re-enter com-
petition for a reasonable time within a reasonable area, equity
will come to the aid of the purchaser and enforce the covenant.
The extent of aid depends upon the court's construction of the
terms. In Railway Audit and Inspection Co. v. Pendleton, 175
La. 4, 142 So. 781 (1932), defendant sold his detective agency
to plaintiff, covenanting not to "enter into a similar or com-
parative line of business" for two years. Defendant then entered
the employment of a rival finn, giving wide publication to the
event. The court denied the plaintiff an injunction on the ground
that agreements in the restraint of competition should be strictly
construed. The court held that entering the employment of
another was not entering into a competing business. Accord,
May v. Johnson, 13 La. App. 521, 128 So. 540 (1930). But cf.
Emery v. Bradley, 88 Me' 357, 34 Atl. 167 (1896), where the
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defendant was restrained from re-entering the field of compe-
tition at any level, i.e., in his own name, in the name of his
son, or as agent or clerk of anyone, for to so engage in compe-
tition directly or indirectly would be a violation of the spirit
of the covenant.
The Emery case, supra, deals with the majority rule that the
attempt of the covenantor to enter into competition under the
name of a relative or an associate is a violation of the self-
imposed restriction against re-entering competition. Yost v.
Patrick, 245 Ala. 275, 17 So.2d 240 (1944); Akers v. Rappe, 30
Cal. App. 290, 158 Pac. 129 (1916); C. H. Brant Co. v. Ainsworth,
156 Mich. 351, 120 N.W. 797 (1909); Bradley v. Paul, 153 Minn.
441, 190 N.W. 789 (1922); Wall v. Chapman, 84 Okla. 114, 202
Pac. 303 (1921); Lyle v. Haskins, 24 Wash.2d 883, 168 P.2d 797
(1946); Merager v. Trunbull, 2 Wash.2d 711, 99 P.2d 434 (1940).
In the last two cited cases, third persons not a party to the
restrictive covenant were enjoined from engaging in business
with the covenantor. The cases were based upon a conspiracy
doctrine. Because the third parties had knowledge of the "no
competition" agreement and nevertheless aided and abetted the
vendor in appropriating the good will which was protected by
the covenant not to compete, they were properly made parties
to the injunction. The acts found to constitute the violation and
conspiracy were in the main investments and behind-the-scenes
management. The reasoning in these two cases was relied upon
by the court in the instant case in which the co-defendants were
found to have conspired in violation of the restrictive covenant
to the detriment of the good will sold to the plaintiff.
An interesting problem arises when a corporation is the vendor
that agrees to refrain from competition. Does the restrictive
covenant run only to the corporate entity, or does it reach be-
hind the entity and bind the corporate officers, directors, and
stockholders? In Hall Mfg. Co. v. Western Steel and Iron Works,
227 Fed. 588 (7th Cir. 1915), defendant corporation sold the
production of a line of farm implements to plaintiff, agreeing
not to enter into competition. In violation of the agreement,
defendant company re-entered competition. The plaintiff prayed
for an injunction to restrain the defendant company, and one of
its officers in particular, from engaging in competition. The court
enjoined the corporation but said that the covenant did not
affect the officers, directors, or shareholders from competing
with plaintiff outside of the entity of the defendant company.
See Sloan v. Charlevoix State Savings Bank, 260 Mfich. 291, 244
N.W. 477 (1932). But cf. Sineath v. Katzis, 218 N.C. 740, 12 S.E.
2d 671 (1941), where defendant owned ninety-eight per cent
of the corporation capital. The court ruled that the covenant
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went behind the entity and bound the owner.
Another element appeared in the present case which lent
itself to defrauding the plaintiff of his rights under the contract
of sale, that is, the use of the name "La Sene" in a conspiratorial
competition. The inclusion of the name in the injunction against
the appellant brings into consideration the question of unfair
competition.
The test to determine if the use of one's own name constitutes
unfair competition is essentially a question of fact. If use of a
certain name will cause public confusion and injury to a prior
user's good will, this is unfair competition. Eastern-Columbia,
Inc. v. Waldman, 30 Cal 2d 268, 181 P.2d 865 (1947), defendant's
use of name "Western-Columbia" enjoined; Dyment v. Lewis, 144
Iowa 509, 123 N.W. 244 .(1909), where defendant's verbatum ap-
porpriation of plaintiff's business name was enjoined. Since a man
generally has the right to use his own name in business, the
court will not enjoin its use if it is similar to a prior user's name
but sufficiently distinguished therefrom. Deister Concentrator
Co. v. Deister Machine Co., 63 Ind. App. 412, 112 N.E. 906 (1916),
here there was found differentiation by virture of the defendant's
advertising which acknowledged plaintiff as a competitor.
The general rule is that everyone has this right to use his own
name in his business ventures. Exceptions are recognized when
the name is used with an intent to defraud, or where the name
has gained a secondary meaning. Then the user may be restrained
from using his own name in his business. Whether the name was
adopted with intent to deceive and confuse the public, Hugo
Stein Cloak Co. v. Stein and Sons, 58 Ohio 377, 16 N.E.2d 609
(1937); or merely adopted unintentionally, Stern Furniture Co.
v. Stern, 52 Ohio 527, 83 N.E.2d 804 (1948), does not matter.
The prior user who has built up good will around his name is
permitted to use the name. In the instant case, the appellant
had permitted the use of his name in the fraudulent conspiracy
with his father and was therefore enjoined from the use of his
own name in his own upholstery business.
It is submitted that the court in the instant case rightfully
took cognizance of the necessary preventives in order to protect
the plaintiff's acquired good will. The appellant had no equities
in the case. The modification of the injunction to permit the ap-
pellant to engage in the upholstery business, even without using
the name "La Sene", was a "legal" leniency. The record reveals
that the appellant had little knowledge of the upholstery busi-
ness. His conspiracy with his father was shown to be nothing
more than a bare intentional attempt to defraud the blameless
plaintiff. But perhaps this is a moral rather than a legal con-
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demnation. Certainly the court was justified in enjoining the
appellant from the use of the name, for its resulting use would
have only lent to the confusion of the public and a deprivation
of the plaintiff's rightful property in the good will for which he
had given consideration.
Peter H. Lousberg
LABOR LAw-CONCURRENT JURISDICTION IN A STATE TO ENJOIN
ACTIVITIES PROHIBITED BY THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
ACT.-Sommer v. Metal Trades Council, 40 Cal.2d 392, 254 P.2d
559 (1953). Plaintiff manufactured, distributed, and installed
auto service stations and equipment. He had in his employ fifty
persons who were not organized. Defendants, affiliated with the
American Federation of Labor, demanded recognition as the
exclusive bargaining representative of plaintiff's employees, and
that only members of the unions be employed by him. The em-
ployees held meetings to organize Local No. 1, without national
affiliation, and demanded that plaintiff recognize it as their ex-
clusive bargaining representative. The plaintiff refused to rec-
ognize either Local No. 1 or the defendant unions as the em-
ployees' collective bargaining agent, whereupon the defendants
commenced peaceful picketing and secondary boycott activities.
Local No. 1, the employees' group, filed a petition with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board for certification as the representa-
tive for collective bargaining purposes and the defendant unions
intervened. The N.L.R.B., finding the plaintiff-employer en-
gaged in an industry "affecting commerce", ordered an election.
It was alleged that a vote was taken and that the employees'
group attained a majority, but it did not appear whether the
election was pursuant to the Board's directions or whether
certification followed.
The defendants continued their picketing and secondary boy-
cott activities whereupon the plaintiff brought this action seeking
an injunction and damages in the state court. A preliminary in-
junction issued and an appeal was taken. The defendants con-
tended, inter alia, that the jurisdictional dispute was governed
solely by federal law; the plaintiff maintaining that the conduct
of the defendants was in violation of and enjoinable pursuant to
the Jurisdictional Strike Act, CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 1115 et seq.
(1947). It is not questioned that the picketing and secondary
boycott activities substantially interfered with the conduct of
plaintiff's business.
Thus, the issue was clearly presented: whether a state court
may exercise jurisdiction over a subject matter explicitly cog-
nizable by the National Labor Relations Act as amended, 61 STAT.
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136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (Supp. 1952), which has
placed the primary and exclusive duty upon the Board to re-
dress unfair labor practices.
It was held in the instant case that the state court had juris-
diction to issue the injunction notwithstanding federal law gov-
erning the same subject matter. The court stated its position,
254 P.2d at 563:
It may . .. be assumed that the evidence which was relevant in
the representation contest and to the several charges of unfair labor
practices before the National Board bears on the issues here. But it
does not follow that the state court does not have jurisdiction of this
controversy.
The majority opinion attempted to distinguish two prior Cali-
fornia decisions which are in direct conflict with the holding of
the present decision. In re DeSilva, 33 Cal.2d 76, 199 P.2d 6
(1948); Gerry v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 119, 194 P.2d 689
(1948). The grounds of distinction were that in these two cases
there was no state statute or policy which regulated the activity.
This distinction is without substance. Congressional commit-
ment of exclusive jurisdiction to the Board is not erased by the
enactment of a state statute. Cf. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New
York State LRB, 330 U.S. 767 (1947), wherein the Supreme
Court held that the state could not intervene, even though the
Board had not exercised its power, because the Board has ex-
clusive jurisdiction. State court judges too often disregard the
duty imposed upon them by the U.S. CONST. Art. VI. See Testa
v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) and Claftin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130
(1876).
The majority opinion in the instant case was not adhered to
without strong dissent however. The gravamen of the dissent is
that the instant case is controlled exclusively by the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947, supra, therefore jurisdiction being
committed by Congress to the Board; any state policy, legisla-
tive or judicial must of necessity give way. The view of the
dissent is best stated, 254 P.2d at 572:
... it is clear that the circumstances existing here present either a
case of an unfair labor practice, or that the conduct is protected by
the national act .. . which questions are . . . determinable by the
National Board.
The dissenting opinion has a firm basis in law. Other states
have recognized that under such circumstances first resort
should be had to the National Labor Relations Board. Garner v.
Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Etc., 373 Pa. 19, 94 A.2d 893
(1953) aff'd 346 U.S. 485 wherein the state could have provided
precisely the same remedy as that given by the national Act.
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Norris Grain Co. v. Nordaas, 232 Minn. 91, 46 N.W.2d 94 (1951);
Costaro v. Simons, 302 N.Y. 318, 98 N.E.2d 454 (1951); Grimes
& Hauer, Inc. v. Pollock, 119 N.E.2d 889 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954).
The federal courts have likewise held that the NLRB's juris-
diction over activities constituting unfair labor practices is ex-
clusive. Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167
F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1948); Born v. Cease, 101 F. Supp. 473 (D.C.
Alaska 1951). In Capital Service, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 204 F.2d 848
(9th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 501 (1954) a state court had is-
sued an injunction enjoining consumer boycott activities. Upon
petition by the Board to a federal district court the defendants
were enjoined from further availing themselves of the benefits of
the injunction issued by the state court. The court stated its
reason, 204 F.2d at 852:
... Congress has pre-empted this function to the National Labor
Relations Board and ... the state court is without jurisdiction to
issue such an injunction. Such a boycott to enforce unionization is
prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act, Section 8(b) (1) (A).
Precursory decisions to that of Capital Service, supra, were Di-
rect Transit Lines v. Local Union, 199 F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1952);
Amazon Cotton Mill, supra; Pocahontas Term Corp. v. Port-
land Bldg. & Const.,;Etc., 93 F. Supp. 217 (S.D. Maine 1950).
The Supreme Court has recognized that ".... uncertainty as to
which [tribunal] is master and how long it will remain such can
be as disruptive of peace between various industrial factions as
actual competition between two [tribunals] for supremacy." La
Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin ERB, 336 U.S. 18, 26
(1949). Cf. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) wherein it was
held that federal rights could not be frustrated by state legisla-
tion.
The majority opinion in the instant case could not be depend-
ent upon the legislative history of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act. It was not the intent of Congress to permit common
law courts to apply common law standards to labor activities
affecting commerce. See 2 LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 p. 1057 (1948); Cox, The Role
of Law in Labor Disputes, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 592, 601 (1954). The
proceeding is wholly statutory. N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The legislative intent to preclude
state action may be express as well as implied. Napier v. At-
lantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926). The will of Con-
gress ".... is to be discovered as well by what the legislature has
not declared, as by what they have expressed." Houston v.
Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 20-22 (U.S. 1820). The judicial duty of
determining that intent is not to be lightly regarded. Cf. Mr.
Justice Holmes' statement of the duty in Johnson v. United
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States, 163 Fed. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908).
Congress, in its wisdom, has provided the plaintiff in the in-
stant case a well considered remedy or remedies. Section 8(b)
(4) of the Taft-Hartley Act regulates and prohibits secondary
boycotts for certain specified objectives. If the activity is prohib-
ited by this section it then becomes mandatory upon the Board
to petition the proper district court and that court has jurisdic-
tion to grant such injunctive relief as it deems just and proper,
notwithstanding any other provision of law pursuant to § 10 (1).
Section 303 (b) provides the plaintiff with a remedy for the re-
covery of damages either in a federal district court or a state
court having jurisdiction.
The decision in the instant case ignores the apparent poten-
tials of conflict. If it were to declare its relief ancillary to NLRB
action, it may result in a deprivation of rights protected by fed-
eral law, especially were the NLRB to find that the charge of
violation of § 8 (b) (4) to be wthout merit. It is a reasonable
inference from the legislative history of the Act that if certain
activities are not prohibited they are meant to be left free of
restriction. Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Etc.,
346 U.S. 485 (1953); Grimes & Hauer, Inc. v. Pollock, supra.
The Supreme Court has held that "Congress must be deemed
to have determined that the rule laid down and the means
provided to enforce it are sufficient and that no other regula-
tion is necessary." Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341,
345-346 (1927). In order that the Board may give a uniform
application of standards to controversies affecting commerce
the states should voluntarily refuse jurisdiction over such dis-
putes. The reason for excluding state administrative bodies
from assuming control of matters placed within the competence
of the federal Board also excludes state courts from like action.
Cf. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State LRB, supra.
To make every labor dispute affecting commerce dependent
upon the varied applications of state law would reduce the na-
tional Act to a mere futility. This certainly was not the Con-
gressional intent except in the areas explicitly stated by Con-
gress. The instant case does not fit into one of those exceptions.
Wilbur L. Pollard
SALES--IM-PLIED WARR&NTY-LiADiLrrY OF SELLER FOR INJUR-
Ious SUBSTAN CE IN PRoDUCT.-Simon v. Graham Bakery, .... N.J.
Super. , 105 A.2d 877 (App. Div. 1954). The plaintiff pur-
chased a loaf of bread from the defendant who was both manu-
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facturer and seller, and in the process of consumption the plain-
tiff was cut by glass imbedded in the bread. The complaint
being simply drafted, the defendant, assuming that the plain-
tiff would proceed on the theory of negligence, prepared to intro-
duce evidence as to the care exercised in the manufacture of
the bread. On the morning of the trial, the plaintiff announced
that he would base his action on breach of the defendant's im-
plied warranty of fitness. The latter offered testimony of due
care but it was rejected by the trial court with the result that
judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed
to the superior court contending that he was prevented from
adequately defending his case, first, because it was not forseeable
that the plaintiff would proceed in contract and second, because
the defense of due care ought to be allowed in either case. The
superior court on the question of the propriety of the exclusion
of said evidence, held that where a plaintiff proceeds on the
theory of a breach of an implied warranty of fitness, due care
was not an element nor a defense, and testimony of that nature
was properly excluded.
In the early law the sale of food stuffs covered-a more compre-
hensive obligation. "In contracts for provisions, it is always im-
plied that they are wholesome; and if they be not, the same rem-
edy (damages for deceit) may be had." 3 BL. CoMnM.* 166. In
Rosewell v. Vaughan (1607) Cro. Jac. 196, 79 Eng. Rep. 171, 172,
the court in discussing warranties applying to sale of goods
stated that ". .. if a man sell victuals which is corrupt, without
warranty, an action lies, because it is against the commonwealth",
thus allowing recovery in tort when a contractual action does
not lie.
This doctrine appeared in our country in 1815 in Van Brackiin
v. Fonda, 12 Johns N.Y. 468, 7 Am. Dec. 339, where the court
held that one may recover damages for deceit if provisions are
not wholesome, for it is implied in contract that the goods will be
fit for the use intended. This theory is acquiesed in by Professor
Williston, noted American authority. 2 WILISTON, CONTRACTS §
995, (1936).
Historically, then, the theory of such an action overlapped not
only a contract but also a tort action, the action on warranty for
fitness sounding in tort since the cases speak of it in the nature of
in action on the case for deceit. See I WILLISTON, SALES § 197
(3d. ed. 1948). The more recent cases concern themselves with
the liability of both the manufacturer and the retailer. In the
instant case the defendant was both and, therefore, no problem
of privity of contract was encountered.
In Collins Bakery Co. v. Savage, 227 Ala. 408, 150 So. 336
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(1933), the bread the plaintiff bought from the defendant man-
ufacturer contained tacks and wires. The court ruled for the
plaintiff but held that the manufacturer was not liable to a sub-
purchaser on the. contract but was liable for negligence in the
making of an article of a dangerous or obnoxious character. And
the court further stated that the foreign matter in the bread
established a prima facie case of negligence. In a similar case on
substantially the same facts, Cohen v. Dugan Brothers, 132 Misc.
896, 230 N.Y.Supp. 743, (Sup. Ct. 1928), rev'd on other grounds,
236 N.Y.Supp. 769 (1929), plaintiff sued both the retailer and
the baker on both breach of implied warranty and negligence.
The court allowed recovery from the baker relying upon the
authority of Mac Pherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382," 111 N.E. 1050
(1916) and held that privity need not be shown between manu-
facturer and subpurchaser if the article was negligently manu-
factured. In the second part of the suit recovery was allowed
against the retailer for breach of warranty tut not for negligence.
Hence we can see the manufacturer's liability sounds in'tort and
the retailer's in contract to purchasers who are injured by for-
eign substances in foodstuffs.
If the goods are canned or packed, thus preventing inspection
by the retailer, some courts have refused to hold the dealer liable
on the theory of implied warranty. This view was illustrated in
Kroger Grocery Co. v. Lewelling, 165 Miss. 71, 145 So. 726,
(1933), where the plaintiff was made ill due to poisonQus sub-
stances in can of tomatoes that the defendant had purchased from
a reputable wholesaler and had subsequently resold to the plain-
tiff. The leading case in opposition to this holding is Ward v.
Great Atlaiitic & Pacific Tea Company, 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E.
225 (1918). Here the plaintiff was injured by a pebble in a can
of beans. The defendant maintained that it would be unjust to
hold them liable for a foreign substance in the beans when they
received a closed package from the manufacturer and had no
chance to inspect the goods. The court said that it could find no
sound reason for making an exception to the general rule (im-
plied warranty of food) in the case of canned goods, and, further
pointed out that the purchaser would be at a disadvantage in
cases of this nature if his only remedy were aganst the manufac-
turer. On similar facts a retailer was held liable for a defect in
canned goods, where the court stated the liability to be based
not on any terms of contract or negligence but on broad princi-
ples of warranty imposed by law as a matter of "public policy"
for the protection of public health. Griggs Canning Co. v. Joesy,
139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942). In cases that refuse to find
the manufacturer liable on contract obligations, negligence is
the basis of recovery. In Crigger v. Coca-Cola, 132 Tenn. 545, 179
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S.W. 155 (1915), the plaintiff became ill when he took into his
mouth the body of a decomposed mouse that was in the "Coke"
he was drinking. The court rejected the contract obligation
theory but said that those who put sealed packages or bottles
on the market owe a high duty to the public but the liability is
based on negligence and the way should be left open for escape
of the innocent bottler or packager.
The question of implied warranty also arises when one is in-
jured due to foreign substance in food served in a restaurant.
Whether or not there is an implied warranty of fitness and qual-
ity of food sold is a matter of conflict. It has been held that the
transaction is essentially a sale of goods for a purpose made
known to the seller, where the latter's skill and judgment is re-
lied on, from which circumstances a warranty can be im plied.
Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407
(1918). However, it is also maintained that the essence of the
transaction is the service in the satisfaction of a human want
and the property of the food is not transferred. Kenny v. Wong
Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 Atl. 343 (1925). If this theory is main-
tained there can be no recovery on implied warranty as there is
no sale and the plaintiff is given the more difficult task of show-
ing negligence in obtaining or preparing of the food before he
can recover for his injury. Of course, regardless of whether it is
a sale or service, the plaintiff can recover for negligence in pre-
paring the food. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Wilson, 74 F2d 439
(5th Cir. 1934).
In conclusion, then, this case appears to advance the public
feeling that a manufacturer should be an "insurer" of his prod-
uct by stripping him of his defense of due care. However,
whether such a situation as in the instant case could repeat itself
where adequate pre-trial procedure is provided is doubtful,
hence the probability of a manufacturer-retailer being surprised
by general pleading is correspondingly slight.
John L. Rosshirt
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANcE - RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AFFECTING
ELIGIBILITY OF CLAnANT FOR BENEmrs.-Tary v. Board of Re-
view, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 161 Ohio St. 257,
119 N.E.2d 56 (1954). The claimant, Regina Tary, applied for un-
employment benefits under the OHIO UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSA-
TION ACT, OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 1345-1346 (1938), on Novem-
ber 25, 1949, when her services with a public accounting firm
were terminated. On January 1st of the following year she re-
fused to accept employment to which she had been referred by
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the administrator of the bureau of compensation because the new
position, unlike her previous employment, .vould reqiure her to
work on Saturdays. The claimant was a Seventh Day Adventist
and observed Saturday as a day of rest, a violation of which
practice would expel her from the denomination.
The board of review denied the claimant any further benefits
because she refused the position offered. Reversal of this ruling
by the court of common pleas was affirmed by the court of ap-
peals on the grounds that claimant's refusal was in good faith
because the offered employment was a risk to her morals.
The problem of the supreme court was to determine whether
or not a personal religious belief would justify the rejection of
an otherwise suitable offer of employment. By a four to three
margin, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that the claimant was
still eligible to receive compensation because the offered job
did not meet the criteria of suitability.
In Kut v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 146 Ohio St. 522, 66
N.E.2d 643 (1946), one of the few cases involving religious beliefs
and disqualification from unemployment compensation, a con-
trary decision was reached. There the Ohio court ruled that a
Jewish employee who observed Saturday as his Sabbath and
refused to accept a job requiring him to work on Saturdays was
not available during the entire week for work and thus disquali-
fied himself for unemployment benefits. In the instant case, the
court fully discussed Kut v. Albers, supra, but ruled that the
case no longer applied because the Ohio compensation law had
since been amended to insure that tendered employment be
"suitable" for a claimant. Risk to the claimant's morals was now
specified by the legislature as a factor in determining suitability,
where formerly only the fitness of the claimant for the job had
any bearing. OHIO REv. CODE § 4141.29 (1949).
How to determine if a job is suitable and what part personal
beliefs and danger to one's morals play in that determination
represent the problem in cases involving refusal by the claimant
of tendered employment. Many of the other state unemployment
compensation statutes are similar to Ohio's, in that in determin-
ing the suitability of a job, they prescribe that consideration be
given to the degree of risk involved to the claimant's morals. See
CAL. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. CODE ANN. § 1258 (1953); nTD. ANN.
STAT. § 1539a (Bums 1951); NEw JERSEY STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5
(1950).
In states where no statutory command prevails, whether or
not employment is suitable depends largely on compelling indi-
vidual circumstances. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance
Comm'n. v. Henry Fischer Packing Co., 259 S.W.2d 436 (Ky.
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1953), (Butcher's job not suitable for epileptic). But, notwith-
standing the instant decision, the cases involving refusal to ac-
cept a job for a personal reason have usually been decided against
the claimant. In Goings v. Riley, 98 N.H. 93, 95 A.2d 137 (1953),
the claimant refused a job working the second or third shift be-
cause she had to care for her paralyzed mother. The court dis-
qualified her for compensation, saying "If the restrictions at-
tached by the claimant are not usual and customary in the partic-
ular occupation, that is an added reason for denying unemploy-
ment compensation benefits." 95 A.2d at 139. A refusal to ac-
cept an offered job on the day shift where the claimant desired
to work only on the night shift because she had two small chil-
dren to raise, made her likewise ineligible for benefits in Squires
v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 172 Pa. Super.
424, 94 A.2d 172 (1953).
Where a sheet metal worker quit his employment to go into
business for himself at a later time, and applied for unemploy-
ment compensation, the Pennsylvania court held him ineligible
for benefits, saying by way of dictum that offensive habits of fel-
low employees, or work which is opposed to one's religious or
moral beliefs, does not constitute sufficient "good cause". Sun
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. Unemployment Compensa-
tion Board of Review, 358 Pa. Super. 224, 56 A.2d 254, 261 (1948).
What does constitute "good cause" then, is difficult to define
without knowing the facts of each case. A Wisconsin court, dis-
cussing the voluntary termination of employment, similar to the
problem in the instant case, stated that a compelling personal
reason for the termination will forestall disqualification. A nine-
teen year old unemancipated girl was thus ruled eligible for
unemployment insurance when her parents insisted that she
give up her job and accompany them to California. Western
Printing and Lithographing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n., 260 Wis.
124, 50 N.W.2d 410 (1951).
Obviously, the extent to which a claimant may go in impos-
ing restrictive conditions on a new position is the subject of great
conflict. Coal miners were refused benefits when they rejected
a 5-day work week because they preferred to work only three
days a week in order to make the work last longer. Unemploy-
ment Compensation Comm'n. v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 65 S.E.2d
524 (1951). But, in Erie Resistor Corp. v. Unemployment Com-
pensation Board of Review, 172 Pa. Super. 430, 94 A.2d 367
(1953), a mother was not disqualified for refusing to accept a
job on the same shift that her husband worked. Work was not
available on any other shift. She declined the job on the
grounds that with both parents working the same hours, their
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